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Abstract 
Protecting software copyright has been an issue since the 
late 1970’s, and software license validation has been a 
primary method employed in an attempt to minimise 
software piracy and protect software copyright. This 
paper presents a novel method for decentralised peer-to-
peer software license validation using cryptocurrency 
blockchain technology to ameliorate software piracy, and 
to provide a mechanism for all software developers to 
protect their copyrighted works.  
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1 Introduction 
Methods to maintain control of copyrighted software 
have fallen into three main categories: software activation 
using a paper based key code, software license validation 
through an online registration (Peyravian, Roginsky, & 
Zunic, 2003) and hardware devices (Morgan & Ruskell, 
1987). Smaller vendors most often implement software 
validation in the form of an activation key, whilst global 
vendors such as Microsoft and Adobe use proprietary 
centralised software license validation services using the 
Internet as the primary medium. 
Software license validation is growing in complexity 
due to a combination of technological and economic 
developments. Commercial models for software sales and 
distribution have become more complex, with multiple 
parties existing in the supply chain including software 
owners, multiple levels of distributors and customers 
(Sachan, Emmanuel, & Kankanhalli, 2009). Similarly, 
software is becoming more complex as the scope of use 
increases (Liu & Roychoudhury, 2012). 
This paper proposes the utilisation of a cryptocurrency 
blockchain similar to Bitcoin, to provide a method for 
decentralised, peer-to-peer, publicly auditable software 
license validation that could be used by anyone from an 
independent software writer to a large software vendor. 
We provide an overview of cryptocurrency blockchain 
functions and discuss the benefit of a decentralised peer-
to-peer architecture. We then proceed to outline a 
construct of a transaction message and processes for 
blockchain-based software license validation, and explore 
future possibilities and issues. 
2 Software license validation 
2.1 Software piracy 
The Business Software Alliance (BSA) defines software 
piracy as the unauthorised copying or distribution of 
copyright software, including downloading, sharing, 
selling, or installing multiple copies of licensed software. 
The Internet has provided a convenient medium for 
software piracy, enabling participants to easily download 
copyright software, and globalising software piracy by 
operating in difficult legal jurisdictions. The BSA 
estimates that in 2013, 43% of software on home 
computers around the world was not properly licensed, 
with a commercial value of US$62.7 billion, and even 
subscription based models such as cloud computing are 
not expected to provide a significant impact on reducing 
software piracy with 52% of online credentials being 
shared (Business Software Alliance, 2014).  
Methods to protect software creators’ copyright have 
been in place since the early 1980’s with a variety of 
methods proposed and implemented. Suhler, 
Bagherzadeh, Malek, and Iscoe (1986) suggested that to 
be successful, software authorisation (validation) needed 
to be inexpensive, compatible with other systems, and 
easy to implement. Similarly, Morgan and Ruskell (1987) 
found various practical measures to deter or prevent 
unauthorised copying, however the feasibility of these 
measures depend on various factors such as cost of the 
measure versus value of the software. Three primary 
methods for software license authorisation are 
considered: copy protection, software validation using a 
distributed paper-based key and hardware-based keys. In 
these nascent stages of computing, the more effective 
methods of encryption and validation were limited due to 
the relatively high cost of hardware devices, limited 
computing power for encryption methods and no form of 
easy distribution medium for software license validation. 
Software copy protection was primarily restricted to 
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alteration of disk sectors to prevent copying, which was 
easily defeated with software tools and license keys that 
were distributed with the software media and easily 
duplicated. These did little to resolve the issue of 
software piracy.  
With the advent of the Internet, new methods became 
possible. Peyravian et al. (2003) proposed a new client-
server software license validation method using the 
Internet with a central database for software license 
validation and detection of hardware platform 
characteristics that the software is installed on. Using this 
method, vendors need to manage end user information 
and need an online validation process for activation of the 
software after installation. Larger software corporations 
such as Microsoft and Adobe have adopted the principles 
of this method. However, online validation requires a 
significant overhead in management of customers, 
maintaining security of personal information and yet the 
validation method is defeatable through easy means, such 
as redirecting DNS to fake authentication servers, code 
modification to remove software license validation 
subroutines, or could be still circumvented through 
duplication of keys as many license models and license 
keys support installation on multiple devices.   
2.2 Methods to comply with software licensing 
Software license validation is growing in complexity due 
to a combination of technological and economic 
developments. Commercial models for software sales and 
distribution have become more complex, with multiple 
parties existing in the supply chain including software 
owners, multiple levels of distributors and customers 
(Sachan et al., 2009). Similarly, complying with software 
licensing is becoming more complex as the scope of 
software use increases, such as feature specific 
enablement keys for software packages, geographical 
diversity of where software is employed, size of customer 
organisations, shifts to software as a service models and 
an increasing use of embedded systems that leads to 
Internet of Things (Liu & Roychoudhury, 2012).  
The need for Software Asset Management (SAM) has 
developed as organisations and users attempt to comply 
with complex software licensing requirements. 
Organisations can choose to manage their software 
licenses through established SAM processes and 
standards such as ISO/IEC19770, which provides 
guidance for organisations to manage software, including 
assessment of conformity, software identification, and 
software entitlements (ISO/IEC, 2012). The BSA has 
established Verafirm to assist organisations with the 
management of their software licensing, that provides 
SAM tools and solutions for SME’s and enterprises. 
 
3 Requirements for a software license 
validation method 
As Suhler, Bagherzadeh, Malek, and Iscoe (1986) and 
Morgan and Ruskell (1987) stress, a successful software 
licence validation method needs to be inexpensive, 
compatible with other systems, easy to implement, and 
relevant to the value of the software.  In addition, to be 
effective against software piracy, a successful software 
license validation method require several premises to be 
met: 
 
1) The license mechanism needs to be hard to copy  
2) Rights to software licenses need to be easily 
validated 
3) Software licenses cannot be repeatedly generated  
4) Validation needs to protect from Man-in-the-Middle 
attacks 
 
Therefore we need a mechanism that can generate 
unique values that can’t be regenerated but can be easily 
verified against the source engine at any time. 
Cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin already provide the 
essential building blocks we need for software license 
validation. Bitcoins are represented as cryptographically 
validated digital signatures and as such, unfeasible to 
copy, whilst the decentralised transaction feature prevents 
double spending of the bitcoin, ensuring a bitcoin digital 
signature cannot be repeatedly generated and used. 
Finally bitcoin transactions are cryptographically secure 
using public key cryptography to prevent Man-in-the-
Middle type attacks. Hence, to meet the premises listed 
for software license validation, we propose a 
cryptocurrency blockchain to create a novel method for 
software license validation mechanism. The following 
section introduces the cryptocurrency blockchain and 
applies the blockchain concepts to software license 
validation. 
4 Cryptocurrencies and the blockchain 
Cryptocurrencies are a new form of virtual currency, first 
introduced with creation of Bitcoin, developed by Satoshi 
Nakamoto (2008). A cryptocurrency is a purely 
decentralised peer-to-peer electronic cash system, and is 
the first technology to successfully overcome the 
requirement for a centralised party to validate 
transactions. The cryptocurrency architecture provides 
several blended features including cryptographic 
validation for all transactions, decentralised money, mint 
and transactions, all stored on public ledgers within a 
quasi-anonymous framework (Brikman, 2014). 
Cryptocurrencies use public-key cryptography to validate 
transactions between all participants, and digital 
signatures to ensure transactional integrity and non-
repudiation (Peteanu, 2014). The cryptographic 
mechanisms used by cryptocurrencies provide strong 
confidentiality, data integrity and non-repudiation 
services (NIST, 2001) and are in use by business, 
government and military organisations globally. In a 
cryptocurrency ecosystem, the public key can be 
considered as the participant’s account number whilst the 
private key represents the participant’s ownership 
credentials. All participants have digital wallets that are 
used to store the private keys, as well as the digital 
signatures that represent the cryptocurrency entitlements 
(coins) that the participants own. Wallets can be stored 
privately, or online on websites or exchanges depending 
on the requirements of the participant.  
Cryptocurrencies as a currency and monetary system 
have yet to prove their robustness in both a technological 
and economic context, needing to be resilient to threats 
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and attacks as well as being a stable and liquid currency. 
However, the underlying feature of interest in respect to 
the cryptocurrency architecture is the blockchain, which 
is becoming the focal point of development of new 
cryptocurrency based applications as developers seek to 
use cryptocurrencies in more practical applications. 
4.1 Transactions 
Transactions are defined as a message between 
participants, and consists of 3 segments: 
 
1) Signature: the originator’s digital signature signed 
with the originator’s private key so that other Bitcoin 
nodes can verify the message really came from the 
originating participant. 
2) Inputs: this is a list of the signatures of transactions 
already in the ledger where the originator was the 
recipient of bitcoins. These are the funds the 
originator is using in the transaction. 
3) Outputs: this is a list of how the funds in the inputs 
should be distributed. All the funds in the inputs 
must be redistributed in the outputs, so the originator 
will pay the recipient the required amount and return 
the remainder as change.  
 
A transaction must have exactly the same number of 
bitcoins in the inputs and outputs. Hence if user U1 has 
10 bitcoins, and wants to send 2 bitcoins to user U2, the 
transaction will result in U1 receiving 8 bitcoins, and U2 
receiving 2 bitcoins. This can be shown as follows: 
 
U1.input(U1, 10) 
U1.send(U2, 2) 
U1.send(U1, 8) 
 
The recipient is identified through their public key, so 
cryptocurrency transactions can be traced throughout the 
blockchain, to the beginning of the creation of the 
cryptocurrency. This forms the mechanism for checking 
the ownership of cryptocurrency bitcoins. Publicly 
verifiable transactions by any node avoids double 
spending and provides a high degree of certainty to the 
participants of the cryptocurrency ecosystem. 
4.2 The blockchain 
The blockchain consists of a series of blocks where each 
block contains:  
 
1) transactions or messages sent between users;  
2) a unique digest created when the new block is 
discovered, called “Proof-of-work”;  
3) the previous reference to the digest of the previous 
block.  
 
Figure 1 illustrates how each block has a proof-of-work 
of the previous block, forming the blockchain. Unverified 
transactions are placed in an unverified transaction 
bucket, and will be inserted into the next block once it is 
created. 
4.3 Cryptocurrency and blockchain economics 
The concept of a cryptocurrency is to overcome the 
necessity of a centralised “trusted authority” (Nakamoto, 
2008) and thus remove or significantly reduce transaction 
fees associated with transactions such as those incurred 
with commercial banking transactions. 
A cryptocurrency, as a peer-to-peer decentralised 
technology, relies on a network of low cost computers 
running software that performs the primary functions of 
the cryptocurrency. The computers running this software 
are known as miners, who create bitcoins, validate bitcoin 
transactions and maintain the integrity of the blockchain 
public ledger. Miners are rewarded for their investment in 
running the bitcoin software through creation of bitcoins, 
and receiving a small transaction fee for their part in 
validating bitcoin transactions. A cryptocurrency 
ecosystem requires a significant number of miners to 
manage the integrity of the blockchain and prevent 
double spending of bitcoins. However, depending on the 
implementation of the cryptocurrency ecosystem, miners 
may not receive transaction fees. For example, Ripple and 
Gridcoin cryptocurrency participants run the transaction 
validation software on a voluntary non-profit basis, 
offering their existing compute and storage resources to 
run the mining software. 
Most cryptocurrency ecosystems have a fixed number 
of bitcoins that can be created, creating a deflationary 
economic model due to the finite number of bitcoins as 
bitcoin value inherently rises due to the limited supply of 
bitcoins. Bitcoins can also only be created at a certain 
rate, determined mathematically by the cryptocurrency 
ecosystem to prevent an oversupply of bitcoins. However, 
some cryptocurrencies such as Peercoin are established 
on an inflationary economic model, with an unlimited 
supply of bitcoins. 
These approaches lead to cost effective cryptocurrency 
and blockchain ecosystems through lower transaction fees 
(Hochstein, 2014) for the cryptocurrency as a financial 
instrument. Furthermore cryptocurrencies are found as 
being considerably lower cost than fiat currencies when 
comparing economic, environmental and socioeconomic 
costs (McCook, 2014). 
In the next section the characteristics of the blockchain 
that will help provide a decentralised software validation 
method are described. 
 
Figure 1: Example of the blockchain (Brikman, 2014) 
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5 Decentralised software license validation 
For the purposes of discussing decentralised software 
license validation, the term bitcoin is used generically as 
a descriptor for a virtual coin from an existing 
cryptocurrency. Bitcoins are actually digital signatures 
that are created and stored in user wallets, and have a full 
publicly verifiable transaction history through the 
blockchain transaction history. The characteristics of the 
blockchain can be utilised to provide a record of all 
software licenses owned by an end user. Through the 
decentralised peer-to-peer blockchain architecture, any 
software developer or vendor can allocate licenses to 
users easily and cost effectively. The principle of 
decentralised software license validation is to use bitcoins 
held by the owner to represent entitlement to software. 
Two primary methods to utilise a blockchain for 
software license validation are the “Master Bitcoin 
Model” and the “Bespoke Model”, discussed in the 
following sections. 
5.1 Master Bitcoin Model 
The Master Bitcoin Model is a basic form of software 
license validation proposed by Fortin (2011) and 
implemented by Lebo (2014) in a proof of concept 
project called “dissent”, using Namecoin as the 
underlying blockchain. In this model, the vendor 
address/bitcoin combination represents license 
ownership, and if the user has a transaction showing the 
bitcoin originated from a specific vendor address, the user 
is considered to have ownership of the software. This 
concept is demonstrated in the following example. 
 
The entities: 
 
Vendor1 (V1): owns the Software application S1 
Software1 (S1): the particular Software application 
MasterAddress1 (M1): the address representing S1 
UserAddress1 (U1): the end user address for the 
wallet that holds the bitcoin indicating software 
entitlement 
 
1) V1 creates the M1 “MasterAddress1” on the 
blockchain, representing a particular Software 
application. 
2) V1 then adds some bitcoins to M1, loading it with 
some bitcoins that when transferred will represent 
entitlement to the Software application. 
3) The end user purchases the Software application 
through a non-cryptocurrency transaction. 
4) V1 transfers a Master bitcoin from the M1 address to 
the U1 address. The transaction itself confers the 
ownership of the bitcoin, and the end user now has 
the bitcoin from M1, the Master bitcoin, in the user’s 
associated wallet. Hence, the user’s ownership of a 
bitcoin from M1 confers entitlement to the Software 
application, and is a transaction publically verifiable 
on the blockchain.  
5) The Software application then validates that U1 has 
received a transaction from M1, and is the last 
transaction in the chain of transactions. 
 
The sequence of transactions can be shown as follows: 
 
V1.create(M1) 
V1.send(M1, 100) ‘V1 adds 100 bitcoins to M1 
Software purchase  
M1.send(U1, 1)  
S1.validate(U1)  
 
Ownership of the Master bitcoin can be transferred as 
shown in Figure 2, so that the software vendor can be 
guaranteed only a single user is using the software though 
checking the blockchain “chain of title” for the Master 
bitcoin originating address. Hence, U1 can now transfer 
ownership to a new party, U2. Again, the transaction 
itself confers the ownership, and any entity can verify the 
chain of transactions from U2, to U1, and back to M1 to 
 
Figure 2: Master Bitcoin Model transfer of ownership sequence example 
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confirm that current ownership is held by U2, who will 
have the last transaction in the chain of transactions. 
M1.send(U1, 1), U1.send(U2, 1)  
 
Since bitcoins do not have serial numbers, once a non-
Master bitcoin is combined with a Master bitcoin, the 
originator of each specific bitcoin cannot be identified 
because in reality, they are simply digital signatures that 
have been combined to form a new digital signature. 
However, in the Master Bitcoin Model, the value of the 
Master bitcoin is not important, only the fact that there is 
a transaction history from the originating Master bitcoin. 
Fortin (2011) proposes that if a Master bitcoin is 
combined with a non-Master bitcoin, the biggest recipient 
is the one that holds the Master Bitcoin, or whoever has 
the lowest address (alphanumerically) has precedence for 
ownership of the Master bitcoin. This property establishes 
non-divisible ownership of the Master bitcoin allowing 
ownership to be transferred. 
In summary, using a unique blockchain address to 
represent a particular software application, the Master 
Bitcoin Model can be used to provide non-repudiable 
proof of ownership of a bitcoin that originated from a 
specific address, thereby conferring the entitlement of the 
software license to the user. However, the software 
application will need to have the capability to read the 
blockchain to establish the chain of title to the user. 
5.2 Bespoke Model 
As mentioned earlier, most cryptocurrencies are designed 
with a currency in mind and so they create virtual coins 
represented as digital signature that are stored in users’ 
wallets and have a full publically verifiable transaction 
history that is stored on the blockchain. For the purposes 
of discussing the Bespoke Model, we define a Token as a 
digital signature that represents entitlement to a specific 
software application, rather than a bitcoin, because the 
license validation model is not using digital signatures to 
represent a virtual currency. A user address that holds a 
particular Token from a specific vendor address is 
entitled to the software license, and therefore is entitled to 
use the software. Hence, the vendor/token combination 
represents the entitlement for use of the software. 
Blockchain specifications vary from cryptocurrency to 
cryptocurrency, and as such, cryptocurrencies can be 
architected with unique characteristics to meet purpose 
specific applications. The Bespoke Model uses a custom 
blockchain transaction specification that includes 
additional fields tailored to the requirements of a flexible 
software license validation schema. This would provide 
the scope needed for the wide range of users and license 
models in the modern technology environment. We can 
also provide several useful mechanisms using the 
blockchain as the basis for license validation, license 
upgrade, transfer of ownership and even software 
integrity checking. A customised blockchain 
specification, as shown in Figure 2, could include new 
blockchain fields to improve software license validation 
and prevent software piracy through software integrity 
checks and protecting the software from reverse 
engineering and executable code modification. 
These fields are all stored on the blockchain as data, 
encrypted using the in-built cryptocurrency public/private 
key mechanisms. In principle, the software vendor 
utilises the user’s public key to encrypt the data being 
placed into the fields, with the user’s private key required 
to decrypt the fields. The user can confirm the transaction 
integrity signature with the vendor’s public key. 
The custom fields outlined in the proposed 
specification are described as follows.  
The Token is used for standard license validation 
mechanisms where the ownership of the Token 
demonstrates entitlement. The Token can be used for 
software license validation operations such as for 
software upgrades, or to provide a unique attribute to the 
transaction, such as “first 100 purchasers” that may have 
collectible value in the future.  
The License Key provides advantages over the Master 
Bitcoin Model because many software applications have 
specific features within the application that are activated 
on a per feature basis. Having the License Key securely 
held on the blockchain means software vendors can easily 
enable “feature activation”, and have flexibility with 
software application licensing models, where users could 
rent software use for a small periods of time, rather than 
purchasing or renting use on a month basis. 
Similarly, the vendor can place a software hash of the 
application on the blockchain. A bootstrap loader or the 
software itself can read the hash and check the software 
version. This hash can be updated with every new patch, 
plus minor or major releases of the software. This could 
protect software from malware infection or some forms of 
reverse engineering. 
Additional protection could be provided through a 
bootstrap loader, which is a portion of executable code 
that is used to pre-execute the software application or to 
be used as an integral part of application execution. The 
purpose of this is to further prevent reverse engineering 
of the software application. At some stage the 
unencrypted bootstrap code will be executed and stored in 
memory, and thus susceptible to interception by reverse 
engineering. This bootstrap code can change with every 
patch, and minor and major release, making reverse 
engineering a constant effort. 
The signature field is a possible additional field that 
can be used by the vendor to sign the entire transaction 
contents using the private/public key pair of the software 
MasterAddress.  
Existing software validation uses digital signatures to 
verify downloadable software and digital certificates to 
 
Figure 3: Customised blockchain specification for License Validation 
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prevent Man-in-the-Middle attacks during the download 
process. However the proposed custom specification 
provides validation of installed software on the user’s 
device on an ongoing basis, providing risk mitigation 
against malware code injection attacks. 
Exploring these concepts further, we look at the Token 
feature. As already mentioned, the Token is used to 
confer ownership, however in comparison to the Master 
Bitcoin Model, the Bespoke Model presents significantly 
more opportunities to use the Token for software license 
validation purposes. In addition to validating that the user 
owns the Token, it can be used for in mechanisms to 
upgrade software versions or transfer of ownership. In the 
first instance, license validation by reading the Token at 
any time interval, say every 600 seconds, user 
login/logoff, or software start-up. These examples read an 
existing transaction on the blockchain, but don’t create a 
transaction. For updating information on the blockchain 
the mechanism is to create a transaction between the user 
address and the software address that represents the 
software application. Each transaction that occurs creates 
a new user address with its own unique public/private 
key, and a new transaction with data encrypted by the 
user’s new public key. All addresses are unique, with 
their own public/private key pair. For software license 
validation purposes, a transaction process from a device 
with S1 software installed could be like: 
1) S1 reads the blockchain transaction for U1 
2) S1 decrypts the token from blockchain data for U1 
3) S1 checks the Token originates from M1 
4) S1 continues to execute on the end user’s device 
 
Shown as: 
 
S1.read(UserAddress1.transaction) 
S1.decrypt(UserAddress1.Token) 
S1.validate(Token) 
S1.execute      
To upgrade Software application versions such as with 
a patch update, the software application can periodically 
request an update from the vendor. The use of a new U2 
address for the upgraded software application is so that 
entitlement to earlier software versions is maintained 
through U1 in case of downgrade requirements. All Ux 
addresses are stored in the user’s digital wallet, and as 
such all entitlements are associated with the user. The 
vendor could also transparently release new license keys 
with minor releases such as patch updates further 
reducing any risk of license keys duplication. Software 
upgrades could be achieved by:  
 
1) S1 sends a request to M1 with new U2 address 
2) M1 checks the token came from U1 and is valid 
3) M1 creates a new transaction with update data  
4) S1 reads data to check if it needs an upgrade  
5) S1 auto-upgrades 
  
Shown as: 
 
S1.send(MasterAddress1,UserAddress2,Token) 
M1.validate(UserAddress1, Token) 
M1.send(UserAddress2, Token) 
S1.read(UserAddress2, Token, License, Hash)  
S1.upgrade  
 
Although this is similar to existing software version 
checking mechanisms online such as Microsoft Update, 
this process allows the software vendor to re-cut a license 
key or hash code for the software upgrade, and have the 
software automatically validated. Updating the previous 
transaction process to include these fields as shown in 
Figure 4. Both the previous software version and the 
upgraded software version are available for use.  
 
1) S1 send an update request to M1 with new U2 
address 
 
Figure 4: Bespoke blockchain software upgrade sequence example 
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2) M1 checks token came from U1 and is valid 
3) MasterAddress2 M2 created for the new transaction 
4) M2 cuts new License Key for new software version 
5) M2 creates Hash for new software version  
6) M2 creates new bootstrap for new software version 
7) M2 encrypts the new License Key, Hash and 
Bootstrap using PublicKey(U2)  
8) M2 signs the transaction with PrivateKey(M2) 
9) M2 creates new transaction with the new data  
10) S1 reads new transaction data for upgrade 
11) S1 downloads software and auto-upgrades 
12) S1 run itself 
 
Shown as: 
S1.send(MasterAddress1,UserAddress2, Token)  
M1.validate(UserAddress1, Token)   
M1.createaddress(M2)     
M2.License(License.new)    
M2.hash(S1.new)     
M2.bootstrap(Bootstrap.new)    
M2.encrypt(M2.License)     
M2.encrypt(M2.hash)      
M2.encrypt(Bootstrap.new)     
M2.sign(Transaction.new)     
M2.send(UserAddress2, Token)    
S1.read(UserAddress2, Token, License, Hash)  
S1.upgrade      
S1.execute      
 
Hence we have shown that license validation can be 
easily achieved using the blockchain, and through the 
same mechanism, additional integrity and security 
protections can be added. Furthermore, blockchain scripts 
allow for intelligent programming of actions within a 
transaction. This provides a new level of dynamism as a 
transaction may take different actions based on the inputs, 
outputs, field contents and originating and destination 
addresses. New blockchain protocols are being developed 
that include full Turing completeness capability, allowing 
anyone to write smart contracts and decentralised 
applications with their their own arbitrary rules for 
ownership, transaction formats and state transition 
functions (Buterin, 2014). 
5.3 Issues that are overcome 
We can see that the Bespoke Model overcomes the 
problems originally highlighted earlier in this paper, and 
significantly improves on the Master Bitcoin Model. 
However it does require a separate cryptocurrency 
ecosystem to be developed and maintained, whilst the 
Master Bitcoin Model can utilise and run in an existing 
cryptocurrency ecosystem. While the Master Coin 
Method meets the requirements outlined for a successful 
software license validation method and it has been 
demonstrated to be workable in proof-of-concept, it has 
limitations that may detract from its usefulness. The 
Bespoke Model overcomes these as follows: 
 
1) Each software license is hard to copy because the 
license is represented by a transaction between 
vendor and user, is cryptographically verifiable, and 
stored in the user’s blockchain wallet. An adversary 
would require the password to the user’s wallet in 
order to access the user’s private key. Already, multi-
factor authentication mechanisms are available to 
further enhance user wallet security. In addition, the 
license key does not even have to be disclosed to the 
user, so it cannot be copied. Every transaction is 
cryptographically secure and cannot be modified. 
 
2) Software licenses are easily validated through the 
blockchain “chain of title” and the data being held 
within the blockchain itself. Furthermore, having on-
blockchain license keys allows the vendor to 
distribute keys for specific feature activations, and 
allows keys to be re-cut quickly and efficiently 
without any intermediate parties involved. 
 
3) Software licenses cannot be regenerated because the 
software application is taking the license key directly 
from the blockchain, requiring the user’s private key. 
Even if the key generator at the vendor is 
compromised, there is no way to get the license key 
onto the blockchain without the vendor’s private key 
to sign the transaction.  
 
4) There is no Man-in-the-Middle attack possible using 
the blockchain. An adversary cannot intercept any 
data in the blockchain without the user’s private key, 
and cannot redirect DNS or IP traffic to an 
adversary’s custom server to provide software 
validation. 
 
There are additional benefits beyond the software 
license validation method, with clear scope for software 
vendors to provide integrity and protection for their 
software applications. Furthermore, the blockchain peer-
to-peer architecture means that there is no single central 
point of failure for software license validation. Licensing 
validators can be run anywhere around the world, and 
could be run on a not-for-profit basis or on some other 
commercial model as appropriate. Vendors would run 
vendor-specific software to manage a license creation 
process and interaction with the blockchain but will not 
need to maintain their own dedicated license validation 
infrastructure with its associated overheads. 
The proposed software license validation model 
provides an opportunity for small developers through to 
large software vendors to preserve their copyright in their 
software, and prevent software piracy whilst having a 
flexible mechanism to license their software. 
5.4 Potential Issues  
In order for the “Bespoke Model” to work, users will 
need to provide some form of authentication to their user 
wallet in order to access the private keys so that the 
software application can complete its validation function. 
This is a similar process to users needing to access their 
blockchain wallet to conduct any transaction in any 
cryptocurrency, so the action is commonplace. However, 
if we are to achieve true user mobility where a user can 
login to any installed application and be validated for use, 
the wallet will require some portability. In addition, for 
an automated authentication process to work, the software 
application will need to access the private keys for the 
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user addresses to complete the license validation process. 
Disclosing private keys is not desirable, so the wallet will 
need to be an application and have the ability to decrypt 
data on the blockchain and present that to the software 
application through an API interface. Alternatively, the 
user may be authenticated to an OpenID or OAuth 
authorisation service provider such as Facebook or 
Google, to prove their identity and allow authorised API 
requests to the user wallet.  
Other issues are the security threat model for loss of 
data or the compromise of the system if a user loses 
control of a wallet and user credentials are exposed, or a 
vendor system is compromised. Multi-signature 
authorisation already provides potential solutions to these 
issues, similar to two (or more) parties being required to 
sign a bank cheque. This may place an additional 
overhead on the software license validation method, but it 
could also significantly reduce the risk of compromise or 
loss-of-ownership issues.  
5.5 Further Opportunities 
In this paper we deal with licensing on the basis of a 
single user receiving a single license for a software 
application and where a single user can have many 
addresses representing software applications in their 
wallet and on the blockchain. However, in a multi-user 
corporate environment there are additional challenges, 
such as licenses that are not permanently allocated to staff 
and licenses that have to be transferable within the 
organisation. For example, a staff member leaving the 
organisation cannot be allowed to exit with a software 
license in their personal blockchain wallet.  
In the Bespoke Model, each license entitlement 
requires a unique address belonging to the organisation to 
be sent a Token, with multiple addresses defining the 
number of Tokens the organisation has available. Hence 
an organisation with 100 users would have 100 addresses 
in a wallet dedicated to the organisation. The licenses 
need to be allocated to users within the organisation and 
also be revoked. Furthermore, users need to authenticate 
using corporate login credentials, ideally using a single 
sign-on approach to access the license from the 
organisation’s wallet. This requires some form of 
authentication service internally for the blockchain 
software license validation with capability to integrate 
into a service such as LDAP or Active Directory for 
single sign on. An organisational level blockchain license 
validation application is required to implement a 
successful multi-user software license validation method 
in a multi-user environment. 
Additionally, the license validation blockchain method 
provides an opportunity to manage licenses on non-
human operated devices. As the Internet-of-Things grows 
and evolves, these connected devices will require 
mechanisms to auto-update software and validate 
software in a legitimate manner. For example, the 
customer who owns 10,000 Internet-connected devices, 
but only pays software maintenance on 2000 of these 
devices, will only have license keys to update 2000 
devices. This capability is easy to achieve in a peer-to-
peer decentralised software license validation ecosystem, 
and hard to manage using any other type of process.  
Perkins (2014) states that the Identity of Things is a 
growing outcome of the Internet of Things. That is, 
devices and data have a relationship with someone or 
something that needs to be identified, and assets and users 
associated with these need to be managed. The license 
validation method meets the requirements as license 
entitlement is essentially defined as a Token/source 
object, providing the identities of the parties through the 
blockchain address, and the types of activity between 
parties through the transactional history. 
6 Limitations 
There are a number of limitations noted in this paper. The 
blockchain depends on other participants in the 
cryptocurrency ecosystem to create and validate 
transactions. However, we do not explore the blockchain 
ecosystem or business model because there exist myriad 
types of stakeholders who may perceive various 
implications or have vested interests in a blockchain 
ecosystem outcome. These considerations are outside the 
scope of this paper. 
There are currently no standards for cryptocurrency or 
blockchain technology available, although if the software 
license validation mechanism was established, standards 
such as ISO/IEC19770 could be revised to include 
software validation blockchain technology. 
Presently, there is limited peer reviewed work 
available for cryptocurrency subject matter, and readings 
are commonly taken from current industry sources and 
leaders. 
7 Conclusion 
Software license validation has been one of the primary 
mechanisms to prevent software piracy since the mid-
1970’s. The methods for software license validation 
evolved with the Internet to include online license 
validation in addition to the traditional paper based 
license keys provided with software. Software pirates and 
hackers are able to reverse engineer and remove 
protection mechanisms whilst license keys are copied, 
duplicated or regenerated to provide a valid license key. 
We contend that software developers need a license 
validation method that provides a unique license key that 
cannot be copied or regenerated, associates the identity of 
the user with the license key and is cost effective.  
We show that a customised cryptocurrency blockchain 
can be used to provide a decentralised peer-to-peer 
software license validation method that meets the 
requirements for software license validation in a cost 
effective manner through the use of the cryptocurrency 
theory. The blockchain offers many opportunities to 
include software integrity and protection mechanisms, 
providing additional value for software vendors and end 
users. The blockchain software license validation method 
can also be automated to provide license validation and 
identity for Internet of Things devices. 
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